

## Message Text

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11

ACTION EA-13

INFO OCT-01 SS-14 ISO-00 NSC-10 NSCE-00 CIAE-00 INR-10

NSAE-00 RSC-01 PM-03 DODE-00 AID-10 OMB-01 L-02 DRC-01

IO-03 EUR-10 PRS-01 /080 W

----- 108874

R 130835Z NOV 73

FM AMEMBASSY JAKARTA

TO SECSTATE WASHDC 9560

INFO AMEMBASSY SAIGON

AMEMBASSY TOKYO

USDEL PARIS

C O N F I D E N T I A L JAKARTA 13344

LIMDIS

EO 11652: GDS

TAGS: PFOR VS ID

SUBJ: INDONESIAN CONCERN OVER VIETNAM SITUATION

TOKYO FOR SECRETARY KISSINGER, ASSISTANT SECRETARY-DESIGNATE  
INGERSOLL AND AMB GALBRAITH

1. DURING NOV 12 CALL ON PRESIDENT SUHARTO AND NOV  
13 CALL ON ARMED FORCES DEPUTY COMMANDER SUMITRO PRIOR  
TO COM CONFERENCE IN TOKYO, INDONESIANS RAISED WITH  
ME THEIR CONCERN OVER PRESENT SITUATION IN VIETNAM.

2. SUHARTO STATED THAT THERE WAS ONE MATTER  
TROUBLING HIM VERY MUCH WHICH HE HOPED I WOULD MENTION  
TO SEC KISSINGER. INDONESIA HAD ORIGINALLY AGREED TO  
PARTICIPATE IN THE ICCS AND IN CARRYING OUT THE  
PARIS AGREEMENTS BY OBSERVING THE CEASEFIRE, THE  
RETURN OF POWS AND ASSUMING NEGOTIATIONS BETWEEN  
THE WARRING SIDES IN VIETNAM OF A CIMPROMISE POLI-  
TICAL AGREEMENT. SUHARTO SAID THERE IS NO SIGN OF  
SUCH POLITICAL NEGOTIATIONS OR ANY EFFORT TO BEGIN  
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THEM. HOW LONG WOULD THIS GO ON, SUHARTO ASKED,  
AND MCW LONG WOULD INDONESIA BE REQUIRED TO KEEP

ITS CONTINGENT IN VIETNAM IN THE ABSENCE OF ANY ATTEMPT TO COME TO POLITICAL AGREEMENT. IF THERE IS TO BE NO POLITICAL AGREEMENT, SUHARTO ASSERTED, PERHAPS INDONESIA SHOULD BRING ITS TROOPS HOME. SUHARTO HOPED I WOULD TRY TO GET FROM SEC KISSINGER AN APPRECIATION OF THE OUTLOOK IN VIETNAM.

3. I TOLD SUHARTO THAT I HAD TO AGREE THAT, AT LEAST SO FAR AS I KNEW, THERE HAD BEEN NO MOVEMENT YET TOWARD A POLITICAL SETTLEMENT. THE RVN WAS PREPARED TO HOLD ELECTIONS BUT THE FACTIONS WERE MORE INTERESTED IN TRYING TO ASSERT THEIR CONTROL OVER TERRITORY AND PEOPLE BY MILITARY MEANS.

4. SUHARTO SAID IT WAS TO BE EXPECTED THAT THE COMMUNISTS WOULD CONTINUE TO STRUGGLE MILITARILY FOR INFLUENCE AND CONTROL. HE SAW NO HOPE OF A POLITICAL SETTLEMENT UNLESS ONE IS IMPOSED FROM OUTSIDE BY THE BIG POWERS. AGAIN HE SAID THAT UNLESS THERE WERE TO BE SOME IMPETUS TOWARD A POLITICAL SETTLEMENT, INDONESIAN TROOPS COULD NOT BE EXPECTED TO REMAIN INDEFINATELY IN VIETNAM.

5. I TOLD SUHARTO THAT WE WOULD OF COURSE BE DISCUSSING INDOCHINA AT THE COM CONFERENCE AND I WOULD RAISE THE QUESTION HE POSED. I ADDED THAT WE HAD FELT THAT AS BAD AS THINGS WERE IN VIETNAM THEY WOULD PROBABLY BE WORSE WITHOUT THE PRESENCE OF THE ICCS AND WE VERY MUCH APPRECIATED, THEREFORE, INDONESIA'S PARTICIPATION IN THE COMMISSION.

6. SUMITRO WHO HAD WITH HIM INTELLIGENCE COORDINATING BOARD CHIEF SUTOPO JUWONO AND ARMED FORCES SECURITY CHIEF KHARIS SUHAD, STATED THAT WHEN THE LAST VISITED SOUTH VIETNAM HE WAS DISTURBED BY THE GOVERNMENT'S INABILITY TO MAKE PROGRESS IN THE POLITICAL ARENA. HE FELT THAT UNLESS THE GVN CHANGED ITS ATTITUDE ICCS POLICIES, THE NORTH VIETNAMESE WOULD SLOWLY TAKE OVER THE ENTIRE COUNTRY. SUMITRO DID NOT, HOWEVER, APPEAR TO BE AWARE OF ANY IMMINENT POSSIBILITY OF INDONESIA'S WITHDRAWING ITS ICCS  
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CONTINGENT. MY COMMENTS TO SUMITRO WERE SUBSTANTIALLY THOSE I MADE TO SUHARTO.

7. COMMENT: SUHARTO LOOKED TIRED AND SEEMED SOMEWHAT LESS ANIMATED AND ENTHUSIASTIC THAN USUAL. THIS MY ACCOUNT IN PART FOR HIS PESSIMISTIC OUTLOOK ON VIETNAM AND ASSERTION THAT HE MIGHT HAVE TO WITHDRAW INDONESIA'S ICCS CONTINGENT. NONETHELESS IT REMAINS TRUE THAT IF THE GOI WERE TO DECIDE IT IS INVESTING MEN AND RESOURCES IN A HOPELESS SITUATION,

SUHARTO MIGHT FOLLOW THE CANADIAN EXAMPLE.  
GALBRAITH

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## Message Attributes

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**Channel Indicators:** n/a  
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